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Abstract: Suppose that A explains B. Do A and B need to be true? Provided that we have 
metaphysical explanation in mind, orthodoxy answers “yes:” metaphysical explanation is 
factive. This article introduces and defends a non-factive notion of metaphysical explanation. 
I argue that we need a non-factive notion of explanation in order to make sense of 
explanationist arguments where we motivate a view by claiming that it offers better 
explanations than its competitors. After presenting and rejecting some initially plausible 
rivals, I account for non-factive metaphysical explanation by drawing on existing 
applications of structural equation models to metaphysical grounding. 
 
1 Introduction  
Say that A metaphysically explains B. Do A and B need to be true? 
Orthodoxy answers yes. One thing cannot metaphysically explain another unless 
both are so.i I argue that in addition to the familiar factive notion, we must recognize and 
adequately characterize a non-factive notion of metaphysical explanation. 
Why is a ball disposed to roll down an incline plane? One answer is that a downward 
gravitational force acts on the ball. This is a causal explanation. But another acceptable 
answer is that the ball is disposed to role in virtue of being spherical. This is a paradigmatic 
metaphysical explanation.ii It identifies what grounds the ball’s disposition to role supposing 
that dispositional properties are grounded in categorical ones. Metaphysical explanations are 
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widely thought to be identical to or underwritten by distinctively metaphysical relations of 
determination.iii 
Metaphysical explanation is the subject of a fast growing literature and is quickly 
assuming a central role in metaphysics. It underwrites the Argument from Explanation for 
grounding and so backs the “Grounding Revolution” (Audi 2012a; Kovacs 2017). The 
formulation of theses like physicalism implicate it (Dasgupta 2014; Ney 2016). And since 
metaphysical explanation is sometimes claimed to be the tightest explanatory connection, 
giving them is a central aim of metaphysics (Fine 2012; Glazier 2017). 
Given this, we might expect explanation to be factive and so to relate only obtaining 
worldly facts. Metaphysical determination is factive (Schaffer 2009; Audi 2012a; Fine 2012). 
And work on metaphysical explanation usually assumes Explanatory Realism: the view that 
all metaphysical explanations identify or provide information about metaphysical 
determination (Schaffer 2017a). I assume this throughout. I'll also assume that grounding is a 
primitive ontological determination relation relating worldly facts. It is distinct from 
metaphysical explanation and underwrites it.iv 
Still, I argue that metaphysicians need a non-factive explanatory notion. I begin in 
section 2 with an explanationist argument: one that motivates a view by claiming that it 
explains better than its rivals. This sort of argument is ubiquitous and often concerns 
metaphysical explanation. But it is plausible only if understood in terms of non-factive 
metaphysical explanation. Given this, we need a precise account of non-factive metaphysical 
explanation (N-explanation). Though there are almost no existing accounts, I’ll explore some 
plausible options in section 3. I offer my own view in section 4 and conclude by sketching a 
procedure for using N-explanations to help our search for factive metaphysical explanations 
(F-explanations). 




2 Explanationist Arguments 
Suppose all metaphysical explanatory claims are factive. Now imagine two 
philosophers arguing about what accounts for shared properties like redness. Rose is a realist 
about universals. She claims that objects are red when they share the universal redness 
(Armstrong 1980; Lewis 1983).v Neil is a class nominalist. He claims objects are red just 
when they belong to the class of red objects.  
Rose argues that we should prefer realism to class nominalism because realism does 
better on explanatory grounds. Since universals are sparse, they explain objective similarity 
among objects. Two objects are similar in virtue of sharing a universal and different in virtue 
of failing to share one. These paradigmatic metaphysical explanations work by identifying 
the instantiation pattern of universals that metaphysically determines resemblance. In 
contrast, properties are abundant according to class nominalism. Any pair of objects share 
and fail to share infinitely many properties (Lewis 1983). 
Rose's argument has a familiar abductive form. If theory R explains better than 
theory N, we ought to prefer R over N. R does explain better than N. So we ought to prefer 
it.vi Realism explains better in virtue of explaining more – it offers the only adequate 
explanation for resemblance. So we ought to prefer realism to class nominalism.  
This isn't the end of the story: Neil may contest Rose's argument, perhaps by 
offering his own explanation of resemblance (as Lewis 1983 does). But we have enough 
already: explanationist arguments like Rose's beg the question.  
Just as Penelope can’t run faster than Genevieve unless Penelope runs, a theory R 
can’t explain better than a theory N unless R explains. By supposition, metaphysical 
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explanation is factive: if R explains, then it is true. So, if R explains better than N, then R is 
true. Substituting realism for R and nominalism for N, it follows that if realism explains 
better than nominalism then realism is true.  
Because of this, Rose begs the question when claiming that we should prefer realism 
over nominalism on explanatory grounds. If realism explains better than nominalism, then 
realism is true. But it is plausible that true theories are always preferable to false ones. So 
preferring realism involves judging that it is more likely than nominalism to be true. Rose 
argues that realism is more likely than nominalism to be true in part by assuming that realism 
is true and nominalism is false.   
This generalizes to any explanationist argument featuring mutually exclusive theories. 
When we claim a theory R explains better than a theory N, we presuppose that R explains 
and so is true. N must therefore be false. True theories are preferable to false ones and 
preferring theory R involves judging that it is more likely true than theory N. So we have 
begged the question against proponents of theory N.   
We might have expected explanationist arguments to turn on the merits of the 
explanatory packages competing theories offer. We identify the explanations each provides 
and determine which competitor explains best. But provided that a theory R explains, it is 
the only theory among its incompatible rivals to do so. It automatically explains best since an 
explanation is better than none at all. vii Neil therefore has no option in the case at hand but 
to deny that realism ever explains. Conceding that it explains means conceding that realism is 
true and so nominalism is false. 
Considerations like the forgoing threaten the role metaphysical explanation plays in 
theory choice. Weighing the metaphysical explanations offered by competing theories is 
either too easy or too hard. It is too easy when we know which among a set of incompatible 
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rivals is true: explanations are better than their rivals when they are the only ones available. It 
is too hard when we don't know which theory is true. Then we don't know which theories 
explain at all and so a forteriori don't know which explains best. Either way explanationist 
arguments aren’t fruitful. 
Something has gone wrong here. And I think our factive notion of metaphysical 
explanation is to blame (see also Lipton 2004, 58). Perhaps, though, we can avoid a non-
factive notion by employing a preface instead. “According to realism, shared universals 
explain resemblance” doesn’t entail that there are universals or that they really do explain. I’ll 
argue, in section 3.3, that this Preface Strategy offers no obvious advantages over accounts 
of N-explanation (which I’ll take up first) but introduces at least one significant cost.  
We can also avoid N-explanation by giving up explanationist arguments altogether. 
Since these are ubiquitous (examples include Daly 1994; Rosen and Dorr 2002), giving them 
up would be deeply destructive for metaphysics. It would also be very surprising were 
explanationist arguments to uniformly beg the question. 
It's evident that we need a non-factive notion of metaphysical explanation. Now we 
need to account for it; my project in what remains. 
3 Generating a Notion of N-Explanation 
Three possible strategies come to mind: one merely subtracts from F-explanation the 
requirement that it have true relata. Another offers a conditional account, and a third 
attempts to avoid N-explanation using a preface. I’ll argue that each fails in revealing ways. I 
take it any adequate account of N-explanation will do justice to explanationist arguments like 
the one in section 2. 
3.1 The Subtractive Strategy 
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On a natural picture of F-explanation, a set of facts Γ must satisfy a bundle of 
conditions in order to metaphysically explain another fact, [B]. Perhaps Γ and [B] must be 
related by metaphysical determination, connected by some metaphysical law, or bring about 
some sort of unification. Filling this in is a job for accounts of F-explanation. Whatever 
conditions must be satisfied for Γ to F-explain [B] – call these conditions C – we can be 
assured that they include or entail that F-explanations are factive. 
The Subtractive Strategy proposes that the other conditions required for explanation 
are separable from those ensuring factivity. We can generate conditions for N-explanation 
just by subtracting factivity-guaranteeing conditions from the other conditions in C. In this 
way, the Subtractive Strategy defines N-explanation in terms of F-explanation, while 
preserving as much similarity as possible between them. Though we may want to reserve the 
term ‘explanation’ for the factive sort, N-explanations seem to be potential (or purported) F-
explanations of a kind long recognized in philosophy of science. Potential F-explanations are 
possibly true N-explanations (Hempel 1965, p. 38; Lipton 2004, p. 58). In light of this, we 
might think Rose’s explanationist argument can be accommodated with a simple paraphrase: 
Understand Rose to claim that realism offers a better potential F-explanation than 
nominalism does. Potential F-explanation is non-factive. So Rose need not beg the question 
against Neil. I'll argue shortly that cashing out N-explanation in this way is a non-starter. 
A closely related additive strategy, suggested in work by Fine 2012 and Litland 2017, 
reverses the order of priority between N and F-explanation.viii Rather than defining non-
factive explanation and grounding in terms of factive versions of these notions, non-factive 
grounding is primitive and factive grounding is defined by adding a factivity condition. 
Supplemented with unionism, the claim that grounding just is a distinctive sort of 
metaphysical explanation, this view adopts N-explanation as its primitive notion. 
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Both strategies are problematic. The additive strategy takes N-explanation as 
primitive and so declines to analyze it. Yet, our project here is to analyze N-explanation if we 
can. The Subtractive Strategy attempts this. But it can't account for cases of N-explanation 
consistent with the behavior expected of metaphysical explanation. For one thing, I'm 
skeptical that plausible conditions on explanation are generally separable from truth. For 
example, do false explanatory claims unify? 
Setting this aside, the Subtractive Strategy seems not to adequately define the notion 
of N-explanation. My worry is similar to Fine’s worry concerning the definition of non-
factive grounding in terms of factive grounding (Fine 2012, pp. 49–50). The Subtractive 
Strategy can naturally characterize N-explanation as follows: a set of facts Γ N-explains {B} 
iff     ⃟  (Γ F-explains [B]). Situations where Γ N-explains [B], Γ, and [B] are the case verify 
this metaphysical possibility. However, this is too restrictive because it rules out cases where 
the propositions in the N-explanation are jointly impossible. Consider that conjunctions are 
explained by their conjuncts. This slogan corresponds to the conjunction introduction rule 
for grounding and so F-explanation (∧I) (Fine 2012, 58). And given our characterization of 
N-explanation above, ∧I applies equally to N-explanation. In accordance with this rule, any 
conjunction of the form Φ ∧	~Φ should be N-explained by Φ and ~ Φ: its conjuncts. 
However, this is not possible according to the definition of N-explanation since Φ and ~ Φ 
are not jointly possible. So, ∧I  fails to hold generally for N-explanation given our 
definition. To avoid this, we may loosen the definition by allowing cases like ours to count as 
well: Γ N-explains [B] whenever the propositions in Γ are jointly incompatible. But this 
would allow irreflexivity violations since [A] would N-explain itself whenever [A] is 
impossible (Fine 2012, pp. 49–50). Understood as we have, the Subtractive Strategy struggles 
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with extensional adequacy: it is either too restrictive or too permissive. Perhaps with work 
we could eliminate problems like these. However, I see no obvious way to do this.  
3.2 The Conditional Strategy 
The Subtractive Strategy fails to implement the attractive idea that we can generate 
our account of N-explanation by modifying our antecedent view of F-explanation. Perhaps a 
strategy built on subjunctive conditionals yields better results. 
Conditional Strategy: <A> N-explains <B> iff, were [A] and [B] the case then [A] 
would F-explain [B]. 
N-explanations are very much like F-explanations given certain assumptions. For example, it 
is natural to understand Rose’s claim as follows: if it were the case that objects shared 
universals, then objects would be similar in virtue of sharing universals and different in 
virtue of failing to share them. It is because realism explains resemblance in this way that 
realism has more explanatory power and explains better than nominalism.ix 
The Conditional Strategy is friendly to orthodox assumptions about metaphysical 
explanations provided that these are also understood in terms of subjunctive conditionals. 
For example, the Conditional Strategy is compatible with a claim in the spirit of Explanatory 
Realism: for propositions <A> and <B> and their corresponding facts, if <A> N- explains 
<B> then, if [A] and [B] were the case then [A] would metaphysically determine [B] (or 
stand in the ancestral of determination). We can evaluate N-explanations according to how 
accurately they represent the possible (or as we’ll see impossible) determinative structures 
they describe. 
Unfortunately, the Conditional Strategy faces its own difficulties. It cannot do justice 
to the cases that motivated us to posit N-explanation: explanationist arguments. We’ve 
assumed this as an adequacy condition. Specifically, to be any good against Neil’s 
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nominalism, Rose but not Neil must provide Rose’s N-explanation of resemblance. Recall 
that Rose’s argument against Neil turns on the claim that realism N-explains resemblance 
and nominalism does not. This is not the case if it follows from the definition of N-
explanation that Nominalism can offer every N-explanation realism can. 
By agreeing that shared universals N-explain resemblance, Rose and Neil both 
endorse the following conditional: 
Shared Universals Conditional: Were it the case that similar objects shared universals and 
different objects failed to share them, then the sharing or failure to share universals 
would F-explain similarity and difference. 
By Rose’s lights, this conditional has a true antecedent and its truth-value is determined 
wholly by its consequent. When evaluating the conditional, we need only look to whether 
shared universals F-explain resemblance in the actual world. 
Things are very different by Neil’s lights. According to him, the Shared Universals 
Conditional is a counterpossible: a subjunctive conditional with a metaphysically impossible 
antecedent. After all, Neil claims that nominalism is true and necessarily so.x Maybe all 
counterpossibles are trivially true (Lewis 1973, p. 24; Williamson 2008, pp. 171–5). In that 
case, nominalism entails the Shared Universals Conditional. Or, we might extend the familiar 
possible worlds semantics to range also over impossible worlds (c.f. Nolan 1997). 
Accordingly, evaluating the Shared Universals Conditional requires us to examine the nearest 
worlds, possible or impossible, where objects instantiate and share universals. Since realism 
is necessarily false (says Neil), this means examining those impossible worlds that most 
resemble the actual world consistent with the truth of the antecedent.xi Again, the Shared 
Universals Conditional is true given nominalism. Though impossible, the realism-worlds 
described by Rose are similar to the actual world in many respects. They are plausibly among 
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the nearest impossible worlds in which similar objects share universals. The Shared 
Universals Conditional is evaluated with respect to these worlds and in them, shared 
universals F-explain resemblance. 
The Shared Universals Conditional is true given nominalism and that means 
nominalism is consistent with the claim that shared universals N-explain resemblance. 
Understood as the Conditional Strategy requires, it’s no longer the case that realism N-
explains resemblance and nominalism can’t. Neil can offer exactly the same N-explanation 
Rose does and so nominalism N-explains resemblance exactly as well as realism. This 
generalizes and is destructive to explanationist arguments; what motivated N-explanation in 
the first place. In every case where opposing views are jointly metaphysically inconsistent, 
any N-explanation offered by one party can be co-opted by the other. No party can enjoy an 
explanatory advantage on these grounds and explanationist arguments are therefore 
dialectically useless.xii 
Perhaps there are other ways of pressing Rose’s distinctive claim on the relevant N-
explanation. Rose’s N-explanation of resemblance is only an F-explanation if realism is true. 
But it can’t be anything more than an N-explanation given nominalism. Let’s modify the 
Conditional Strategy to capture the distinctive relationship between N-explanations and the 
views that, were they the case, would verify their corresponding F-explanations. 
Revised Conditional Strategy: <A> N-explains <B> according to view R iff, if view R 
were the case then [A] would F-explain [B]. 
The problem with the Revised Conditional Strategy is that Neil shouldn’t agree that 
the right side of the biconditional is true in our case.xiii Applied to Rose’s claim, the revised 
strategy yields the following: 
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Realism Biconditional: Shared universals N-explain resemblance according to realism 
iff, if realism were the case then shared universals would F-explain resemblance. 
According to Neil, the right hand side of the Realism Biconditional is a counterpossible. It is 
evaluated in the nearest impossible worlds in which its antecedent is true. Given nominalism, 
worlds in which universals abound and explain resemblance do not meet that description. A 
wide variety of realism-worlds are closer by. These worlds preserve nominalist claims about 
properties and resemblance in nearly every case, deviating only with respect to a single small, 
local miracle. In them nearly every resemblance fact remains primitive. Perhaps these worlds 
are exactly like the actual world except that they contain just one uniquely instantiated 
universal in some isolated corner of the universe. Since the nearest realism-worlds are not 
ones in which shared universals F-explain resemblance (says Neil), Neil ought to reject the 
right hand side of the revised strategy’s biconditional as applied to Rose’s explanation. 
Supposing the Revised Conditional Strategy, this means rejecting Rose’s N-explanation and 
so denying the alleged explanatory advantage on which her explanationist argument was 
predicated. 
In order to prevent this move, we might modify further. Consider: 
Twice Revised Conditional Strategy: <A> N-explains <B> according to view R iff, if 
view R, [A], and [B] were the case then [A] would F-explain [B]. 
By packing [A] and [B] into the antecedent of the embedded conditional, we prevent Neil’s 
response to the Revised Conditional Strategy. He should agree that if realism were the case, 
universals were shared, and objects resembled one another, then shared universals would F-
explain resemblance. Nonetheless, the concern re-emerges that Neil can co-opt Rose’s 
explanation 
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Neil now claims shared universals N-explain resemblance according to nominalism 
too. Nominalism verifies the following: if nominalism were the case, universals were shared, 
and objects resembled one another, then shared universals would F-explain resemblance. 
Since Rose and Neil ought to agree that the antecedent of this conditional is logically 
inconsistent, the nearest impossible worlds in which it is the case are quite distant from the 
actual world. In them, the Law of Non-Contradiction fails to hold. Nonetheless, this is a 
world in which similar objects share universals and one in which no obvious disruption to 
the world’s explanatory structure has occurred. In such a world, the relevant counterpossible 
is arguably true. Supposing the Twice Revised Conditional Strategy, it is open for Neil to 
argue that shared universals N-explain resemblance according to nominalism. Of course, 
shared universals don’t F-explain resemblance according to nominalism. But on pain of 
begging the question, F-explanation is not what is at issue in Rose’s explanationist argument. 
We’ve assumed an extended possible worlds semantics in this discussion. However, if Neil’s 
counterpossible is trivially true then it remains the case that universals N-explain 
resemblance according to nominalism. 
Perhaps we haven’t exhausted its resources. But the Conditional Strategy faces a 
serious challenge. It must find a way of accounting for N-explanation such that relevant N-
explanatory claims are consistent with the commitments held by both parties to a well-
formed explanationist argument. But it must also ensure that both parties cannot generally 
claim these N-explanations at once. 
3.3 The Preface Strategy  
Maybe we’ve overcomplicated things. Let’s paraphrase alleged explanatory claims 
with “according to view R,” thereby canceling their factive implications. On this Preface 
Strategy, Rose means to claim that according to realism, shared universals explain resemblance. 
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Opponents like Rose and Neil can agree about prefaced explanatory claims even when they 
dispute un-prefaced counterparts. And the Preface Strategy avoids a notion of N-explanation 
altogether. 
Unfortunately, the Preface Strategy struggles to account for claims of relative 
explanatory goodness. What (if any) parsimony advantage it gains by replacing the relational 
predicate “N-explains” with a sentential operator is worth little. 
Operators and predicates often correspond, as is the case here. “According to 
realism, universals explain resemblance” seems equivalent to “universals explain resemblance 
according to realism.” Elsewhere, we choose between operators and predicates largely on 
pragmatic grounds. For example, some prefer the view on which grounding is a sentential 
operator because it makes the logic of ground easier and is neutral about the existence of 
worldly facts (Litland 2017 fn. 8). 
However we formulate them, we must say why non-factive explanatory claims are 
true when they are. On its own, the preface according to view R does not do this and so doesn't 
compete with the views I’ve discussed. Supplemented with plausible accounts of correctness, 
the Preface Strategy very closely resembles the accounts we’ve already considered and 
rejected. 
Several straightforward accounts of correctness are non-starters. Consider: 
“‘According to view R, A explains B’ is true iff ‘A explains B’ is among the sentences that 
constitute R.” This is implausibly restrictive since theories need not include explanatory 
claims in order to support them. Likewise, an entailment view is a non-starter. Consider: 
“‘According to view R, A explains B’ is true iff R entails that A explains B (perhaps together 
with auxiliary claims).” The entailment view counts false Rose’s explanation since the truth 
of realism does not entail that shared universals explain resemblance. The realism-worlds 
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from section 3.2 illustrate this. The Preface Strategy is more attractively understood in terms 
of subjunctive conditionals: “‘According to view R, A explains B’ is true iff were R the case, 
A would explain B.” But this is just the Revised Conditional Strategy rejected in section 3.2. 
We might also treat theories as models. However, the result is very much like the Model 
Strategy I’ll propose in the next section. Plausible versions of the Preface Strategy are not 
distinct from the accounts we’ve already considered; they differ only in the semantic 
machinery they employ. 
It’s because of this semantic machinery that the Preface Strategy does worse in at 
least one respect. Its sentential operator offers less expressive power than comparable 
relational views.  Explanationist arguments often involve competing proposed explanations. 
Suppose in response to Rose, Neil offers a Lewisian competitor: co-membership in a natural 
class explains resemblance. To preserve her claim that realism explains better than 
nominalism, Rose’s explanation must be superior to Neil’s (according to some agreed upon 
standard of explanatory goodness). The Preface Strategy struggles with the resulting 
comparative claim: “Rose’s explanation of resemblance is better than Neil’s.” 
The explanatory notion appealed to here is factive (the Preface Strategy avoids 
commitment to N-explanation). But Rose and Neil can’t both have offered factive 
explanations, since their claims are incompatible. Prefaces are no help since their claims 
require different ones. And a preface like “according to view R” can’t be applied separately 
to each part of the comparative claim. Prefaces operate on sentences, not definite 
descriptions like ‘Rose’s explanation.’ 
Prefacing the whole comparative claim won’t help either. Consider that “According 
to our best theory of explanation, Rose’s explanation of resemblance is better than Neil’s” 
seems to entail “According to our best theory of explanation, Rose explains resemblance.” 
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After all, if Rose fails to explain, then she fails to explain better. Since the preface strategy 
only recognizes the factive notion of explanation, it follows that "According to our best 
theory of explanation, Rose's explanans is true.” 
The prefaced comparative claim also seems equivalent to “According to our best 
theory of explanation, Neil’s explanation of resemblance is worse than Rose’s.” This entails 
that “According to our best theory of explanation, Neil explains resemblance.” Via factivity, 
it follows that "According to our best theory of explanation, Neil's explanans is true.” The 
preface strategy thus predicts that our best theory of (factive) explanation denies the Law of 
Non-Contradiction: it requires that inconsistent theories be true together. This prediction is 
false. A better theory is available and avoids inconsistency by supplementing F-explanation 
with N-explanation.  
We may resist this argument by allowing the prefaced comparative claim to come out 
true when “Neil’s explanation of resemblance” fails to refer. This gambit makes our prefaced 
comparative claim dialectically useless in explanationist arguments. Rose can only make use 
of the gambit by presupposing that nominalism is false and so Neil's offering fails even to 
count as an explanation. This begs the question against Neil. In sum, Rose can’t offer the 
prefaced comparative claim in an argument against Neil’s nominalism without either making 
implausible commitments about our best theory of (factive) explanation – namely it entails 
the Law of Non-Contradiction is false – or by begging the question against her opponent.  
We gain little by pursuing the Preface Strategy. Whatever benefit we enjoy by 
avoiding N-explanation is more than offset by our inability to account for the comparative 
claims that drive explanationist arguments. 
4 The Model Strategy  
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I've argued that metaphysics needs a non-factive notion of explanation in order to do 
justice to explanationist arguments. Though other strategies face serious challenges, I think 
we can do better by developing the following picture: <A> N-explains <B> iff, in a model 
of the right sort, [A] is represented as F-explaining [B]. On this view, N-explanatory claims 
depend on the availability of appropriately understood models. This account is adequate for 
explanationist arguments like Rose's.  
4.1 Structural Equation Models  
Though many things would make adequate models, I will use structural equation 
models (hereafter SEMs) of the sort developed by Pearl 2000. Roughly speaking, SEMs are 
sets of equations that represent networks of relationships among variables. In addition to 
their familiarity in the literatures on grounding and causation, SEMs have at least three 
advantages over alternatives. First, they are more precise than the subjunctive conditionals 
appealed to by the Conditional Strategy. This makes clear exactly what is and isn't part of our 
model and makes explicit how parts of the model are connected (Schaffer 2016, 60). Second, 
SEMs are effective at modeling a wide range of different causal dependencies (Schaffer 2016, 
60). Their expressive power offers a reason to be optimistic that SEMs can model 
explanatory dependence too. Third, this optimism is compounded by the fact that structural 
equation models are already successfully employed to model the metaphysical determinative 
relations that are supposed to underlie metaphysical explanation(c.f. Schaffer 2016; Wilson 
2018).xiv 
Formally, SEMs consist of three ingredients: a set of variables, a set of structural 
equations linking the values of these variables, and an assignment function that specifies 
what values variables actually take. It’s helpful to think of variables as questions answered in 
different ways, each corresponding to a different value (see Briggs 2012). When modeling 
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explanations, these ingredients receive a specific interpretation. Understand variables to 
represent questions about specific states of the world, structural equations to represent 
relations of explanatory dependence, and assignments as answers to the questions posed by 
particular variables.  
For a simple example, consider a model, SOCRATES, representing the explanation 
of {Socrates} in terms of Socrates. A natural way to represent this bit of the world makes 
use of two variables: Socrates for whether Socrates exists and Singleton for whether 
{Socrates} does. Each of these variables comes with a range of possible values 
corresponding to distinct, incompatible ways of answering the questions they pose. Both 
variables ask whether something exists, so only two possible answers corresponding to two 
values are needed: 1 for yes and 0 for no. Its variables and space of possible assignments 
make up SOCRATES signature.  
Next we need to define a structural equation for the model, representing 
relationships of direct explanatory dependence between different states of the world 
represented by variables. These equations have the form A = f(B1...Bn), where A is an 
"endogenous variable" representing dependent conditions and the Bn's are those variables on 
which A depends. This equation says that A's values explanatorily depend on the values of 
the Bn's in the way stated by the function f(x) (Woodward 2003; Wilson 2018). In 
SOCRATES, we need only one structural equation representing the explanatory dependence 
of {Socrates} on Socrates: Singleton = Socrates. In words, {Socrates} exists because 
Socrates does. Together with the signature, this structural equation constitutes the linkage of 
our model.  
Importantly Singleton = Socrates, and more generally A = f(B1...Bn), do not 
involve identity or indicate symmetric relations. Rather, they are relations of asymmetric 
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dependence in which the left-hand variable depends for its values on the right-hand 
variables.  
Lastly, we need to answer the questions posed by the variables in our model. We do 
this by setting a function that maps each "exogenous variable," representing independent 
conditions, to exactly one value. This is the assignment of the model. With respect to 
SOCRATES, we need to say whether Socrates exists. By experimenting with different 
mapping functions, we can chart the behavior of every endogenous variable based on 
possible assignments to the exogenous ones. The model encodes various counterfactuals of 
the form, if Socrates were assigned value n, then Singleton would have had value n. When 
Socrates exists, it follows that {Socrates} exists because Socrates does. When he doesn't 
exist, {Socrates} fails to exist because of it. In short, SOCRATES represents the existence of 
{Socrates} as explanatorily depending on the existence of Socrates.xv 
Fitting SEMs into the intuitive statement of the Model Strategy produces the claim 
that <A> N-explains <B> iff the right sort of SEM is available and it represents B as 
explanatorily depending on A. Importantly, this intuitive sketch is compatible with a variety 
of existing approaches to causal and metaphysical explanation. It has so far paralleled 
interventionist treatments of causation and grounding but nowhere presupposes them since 
its sole concern is explanation (and I have assumed separatism). Nonetheless, it isn’t 
surprising that the network of potential metaphysical explanations is well represented by 
SEMs supporting interventionist counterfactuals.  
4.2 Models of the Right Kind 
It's time to say what it takes for a model to be of the right kind. Insofar as we're 
interested in what a statement would explain supposing that it is true, we should choose our 
models for their ability to represent the explanatory connections posited or presupposed by 
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these statements. Intuitively, the model should represent the world as it is supposed to be by 
the lights of the explanans and its background, so we can see whether that explanans really 
N-explains as advertised. I encode this idea in the following conditions.  
Apt: A model, M is of the right kind iff 
1. M's signature represents the system under study as it is supposed to be according 
to the explanans and its background.  
2. M's linkage is consistent with those general principles that we take to actually 
govern factive explanatory dependence.xvi 
3. M's assignment represents the system as being in a state where the explanans is the 
case.  
Clause 1 of Apt ensures that the system being represented is carved up in a way that 
reflects the ontological commitments supposed or assumed by the explanans of the N-
explanation under investigation, where the system being represented is determined by the 
contents of the explanation. This doesn't require that the explanans make any explicit claims 
about the system's ontological joints or determinative structure.   
With respect to the {Socrates} explanation, the system being described is a subset of 
the world's set theoretic structure. We need not be realists about that structure in order to 
represent it as it is supposed to be by those who are. While we might have carved up the 
system in many ways, doing so in terms of Socrates and {Socrates} is most perspicuous 
given the explanation under evaluation.  
Consistent with the aim of representing the commitments supposed by the relevant 
explanans, clause 1 ought to prevent the signature of an apt model from being interpreted to 
represent more features of the system than are included or supposed by the explanans. Since 
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it is possible to significantly alter or destroy an explanation by adding more information, 
allowing supplementation undermines the usefulness of our models.  
Clause 2 of Apt ensures that the structural equations representing alleged explanatory 
dependence are consistent with antecedent commitments concerning the nature of F-
explanation. This ensures that, when its variables and assignments veridically represent the 
world, the structural equations of our model represent genuine F-explanatory dependence. I 
will not try to say to which general principles a linkage ought to conform. That job is for 
theories of factive metaphysical explanation. Nonetheless, our assumed Explanatory Realism 
furnishes some examples. Explanatory connections only obtain between dependent 
outcomes and that which constitutively generates them (e.g Schaffer 2017b, p. 304). As a 
result, explanatory dependence is asymmetric, irreflexive, and transitive.xvii We may disagree 
about which principles in fact govern explanatory dependence and so disagree about what 
clause 2 entails. In that case, I suggest that we develop rival models in parallel and compare 
their fruits. 
Clause 2 and the assumption of Explanatory Realism jointly entail that apt models 
must encode specific commitments concerning metaphysical determination. We can make 
these commitments explicit merely by reinterpreting the linkage of the model so that A = 
f(B1...Bn) says that A's values are metaphysically determined by the values of the Bn 's in the way 
stated by function f(x). The linkage of an apt model must represent a direction of 
explanatory priority whose entailed determinative commitments are consistent with those 
generalizations concerning metaphysical determinative relations that are supposed by the 
explanans and its background: e.g. sets are grounded in their members (Schaffer 2017b).xviii 
This feature of clause 2 is especially important for ruling out spurious models. And as a 
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matter of consistency, the relevant theory's other theoretical commitments should constraint 
entailed determinative commitments.  
Finally, clause 3 ensures that the exogenous variables representing the system under 
study are set to values that represent a state in which the explanans is true. 
4.3 The Model Strategy Stated  
Armed with the notion of an apt model we're in position to officially state the Model 
Strategy.  
Model Strategy: <A> N-explains <B> iff there is an Apt structural equation model M, 
such that assignments of M’s variables representing <B>’s being true are based on 
assignments of M’s variables representing <A>’s being true. 
We can further define notions of complete and partial N-explanation: <A> completely 
(partly) N-explains <B> iff the assignments of M’s variables representing <B>’s being true 
are based wholly (partly) on assignments of M’s variables representing <A>’s being true. 
Call M an apt witnessing model for the relevant N-explanatory claim. M satisfies Apt 
and witnesses the correctness of its corresponding claim in the sense that what it is for the 
claim to be correct is for there to be an apt model representing the N-explanation it asserts. 
Models that satisfy Apt are intentionally designed to represent the world's constituents and 
explanatory connections as supposed by the explanation under scrutiny. This reflects the 
intuition that N-explanations ought to be just like F-explanations provided that we've 
supposed the truth of the explanans. The Model Strategy adds a precise way of 
understanding this intuition.  
The Model Strategy also does justice to the intuition that N-explanatory claims are 
claims about the world. This is because discovering that one thing N-explains another 
consists in discovering certain worldly facts: namely, that the world is such that there is an 
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apt witnessing model. What exactly must the world be like in order for this to be the case? 
The Model Strategy is itself neutral and this is a virtue of the view. In particular, we can 
afford to remain relatively neutral with respect to ontological debates concerning abstracta 
like models. The Model Strategy makes no claims about what models are, only that the world 
is such that they exist. Since models may exist without being metaphysically fundamental, 
irreducible, or may exist in a lightweight sense, the Model Strategy is compatible with a wide 
range of views about their ontology (see Schaffer 2015).xix 
  In order to determine whether an N-explanatory statement is true, we need only 
determine whether there is an apt witnessing model. It bears repeating that whether this is 
the case is independent of the outcomes of those metaphysical debates that might appeal to 
N-explanation. In particular, the Model Strategy is totally silent about whether apt witnessing 
models are veridical representations of the actual world. It claims only that apt models 
represent the explanation as correct: there is a model that represents the explanans as true, 
whose variable basing functions are consistent with the general principles governing factive 
explanatory dependence, and which bases the values of the explanandum on the values of 
the explanans.  
By the lights of the Model Strategy, symmetric pairs of N-explanations are possible. 
The priority monist claims that the cosmos ("the ultimate concrete whole") explains its many 
parts (Schaffer 2010, p. 31). The priority pluralist says it goes the other way round. Each 
theory offers a successful N-explanation differing only in its direction of explanatory 
priority. All this is as it should be: the monist and pluralist differ only about what determines 
what. Yet we can certainly ask which theory explains best (Schaffer 2010, p. 59). There 
remains an important sense in which N-explanation is asymmetric. There can be no single 
model, and so no single N-explanation, featuring explanatory circles. Such a model would 
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violate clause 2 of Apt by requiring circles of metaphysical determination, something 
forbidden given explanatory realism and standard assumptions about metaphysical 
determination.  
    The Model Strategy bears some resemblance to the Conditional Strategy considered 
and rejected in section 3.2. It’s natural to think of both strategies as species of a common 
genus unified by the thought that N-explanations are like F-explanations given that we have 
supposed or stipulated the truth of their explanantia. On the Conditional Strategy, we 
attempted to do this by examining the nearest worlds where the explanans is true. The 
Model Strategy is distinguished by a different approach: we build the truth of the explanans 
into the model and then examine how this affects the truth of the explanandum. Because the 
Conditional Strategy directs us to whatever worlds meet the description “the nearest worlds 
in which the explanans is true,” we’ve seen that it invites disputes about which worlds are 
nearest. In contrast, the Model Strategy identifies the relevant situation directly, thereby 
avoiding such disputes. 
The Model and Conditional strategies might be brought closer together by 
understanding apt models as ersatz worlds selected by an appropriate selector function. 
Though not my view, such a model based conditional strategy better resists the objections 
offered in section 3.2. On it, N-explanations are subjunctive conditionals verified by models 
interpreted as ersatz worlds. Nonetheless, model based conditional strategies are importantly 
different from the Model Strategy I’ve proposed. Unlike model based conditional strategies, 
The Model Strategy does not require commitments to ersatz worlds. It requires only that apt 
SEMs are capable of serving as abstract models of systems as they are supposed to be by the 
explanantia of some relevant N-explanatory statement. 
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4.1 The Model Theory Applied  
To see in more concrete terms how the Model Strategy works, revisit the 
disagreement between Rose and Neil. Recall that Rose’s explanationist argument against Neil 
goes as follows: realism explains better than nominalism because it, unlike nominalism, can 
explain what makes for genuine similarity and difference. The explanations for resemblance 
that Rose has in mind plausibly share some common forms – X is similar to Y (in some 
respect) because X and Y both instantiate universal U; X is a duplicate of Y because every 
universal instantiated by one is instantiated by the other; and X is different from Y (in some 
respect) because X instantiates U and Y does not. Let’s take up the explanation of a 
particular similarity as a representative instance. Realism explains that the ball and the stop 
sign have the same color because they both instantiate the universal scarlet. 
The Model Strategy invites us to cash out Rose’s N-explanation in terms of the 
existence of apt models whose variables witness the explanation by standing in the right sort 
of variable-basing relationships: those that represent their targets as explanatorily depending 
on alleged explanantia. 
This requires that there be an apt structural equation model in which the variable 
representing color resemblance is based on variables representing the instantiation of color 
universals in the ball and the sign. The Model Strategy proceeds in two steps. First, we need 
to construct a model witnessing the N-explanation Rose has offered. Second, we need to 
determine whether the resulting model is apt. If so, then Rose has offered a correct N-
explanation’s. We can weigh its explanatory virtues and vices just as we do for F-
explanations. 
A very simple model witnessing Rose’s N-explanation is easy to design and can be 
modified in various ways to make more sophisticated similarity judgments, to capture other 
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respects of sameness, or to describe comparisons between more than two objects. Call our 
model RESEMBLANCE. Its signature includes variables representing the instantiation of 
color universals in the ball (Ball) and sign (Sign) and a binary variable representing whether 
or not they are exactly the same color (Same). Ball and Sign are exogenous variables while 
Same is endogenous. Since their values correspond to answers to the question ‘what colors 
are the ball and sign,’ let Ball and Sign take as possible values any of the rational numbers. 
Interpret these numbers to represent maximally determinate color universes (perhaps 
including the absence of any color universal) assigned via any adequate method we’d like.xx 
Since Same is a binary variable, it can be answered either yes (1) or no (0). 
According to the explanation that Rose has offered, the instantiation of color 
universals in the ball and sign collectively fully explain their sameness. Given this, we can 
assign a linkage to represent the relationship of explanatory dependence that Rose takes to 
hold. Its structural equations will run from variables representing the instantiation of 
universals to variables representing sameness. 
In this case, just one structural equation is needed: 
 
 Finally, we state what color universals are instantiated by the ball and sign. This 
means assigning Ball and Sign values drawn from their space of possible values. The 
explanans states that both objects are scarlet, so we assign Ball and Sign to whatever value 
corresponds to scarlet in our chosen enumeration. Supposing for the sake of simplicity that 
scarlet is a maximally determinate color represented by the number 1, then Ball = Sign = 1. 
By basing Same on Ball and Sign, RESEMBLANCE represents color sameness as 
explanatorily depending on the instantiation of color universals in the ball and the sign: these 
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objects perfectly resemble one another color-wise iff they instantiate the same maximally 
determinate color universal. RESEMBLANCE witnesses Rose’s alleged N-explanatory 
claim. So, we have completed the first step required by the Model Strategy. What remains is 
to determine whether RESEMBLANCE is an apt witnessing model. Rose’s N-explanation is 
correct if and only if this is the case. 
Apt places constraints on all three components of RESEMBLANCE, beginning with 
its signature. Specifically, RESEMBLANCE counts as apt iff it represents the relevant 
objects and universals as they are supposed to be according to the explanans. This is 
plausibly the case in RESEMBLANCE. Its variables carve the system up naturally and at the 
right level of description. It represents the explanans as a pair of exogenous variables, the 
explanandum as an endogenous variable, and the contrast space of values is appropriately 
rich. 
RESEMBLANCE also clearly satisfies Apt’s constraint on its assignment. An 
assignment is apt when it represents the explanans as being the case. Since both Ball and 
Sign are assigned the value representing the universal scarlet, the relevant bit of the world is 
represented as it is claimed to be by the explanans. 
Finally, Apt requires that RESEMBLANCE’s linkage be consistent with those 
general principles that we in fact take to govern F-explanatory dependence. In absence of a 
canonical theory, it is not clear precisely what this requires. Nonetheless, our assumption of 
Explanatory Realism furnishes several substantive constraints. Factive metaphysical 
explanations chart the world’s relations of constitutive generation and, in virtue of this, are 
plausibly irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. 
The structural equation in RESEMBLANCE is apt when it charts the world’s 
relations of constitutive generation as they are supposed to be by the explanans and its 
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background. This equation describes an irreflexive relationship. Its interpretation ensures 
that it is asymmetric, and it isn’t complex enough to exhibit intransitivity. Finally, the 
directed explanatory dependence that it imposes entails specific metaphysical determinative 
connections that are consistent with those generalizations concerning constitutive generation 
or grounding that Rose in fact takes to govern the relationship between resemblance and the 
instantiation of universals. Rose is plausibly committed to the claim that the instantiation of 
universals in objects metaphysically determines the resemblance between them. The linkage 
of our model bases resemblance on shared universals consistent with this commitment. So, 
RESEMBLANCE is plausibly an apt witnessing model and as a result, Rose’s N-explanatory 
claim succeeds. 
As before, none of the ingredients in Rose’s apt witnessing model are factive: neither 
representation in the model nor basing relations among variables require that the thing 
represented actually obtains. So, Rose’s model should be amenable to Neil as well: it avoids 
begging any questions against his nominalism. In order to evaluate the N-explanatory claim, 
Rose and Neil develop structural equation models representing it, determine whether these 
models appropriately witness the explanation in question, and test whether they are apt in 
light of Rose’s commitments concerning grounding.xxi Whether N-explanation occurs is 
determined solely by the features that the model actually has. Rose and Neil can agree about 
them. 
  In light of this agreement, we might worry that the Model Strategy is subject to the 
same problems that plagued the Conditional Strategy. After all, the Model Strategy aims to 
capture what's plausible about the Conditional Strategy and bears some resemblance to it. 
The problem for the Conditional Strategy (whether in its original or revised form) was that it 
left Rose unable to press an explanatory advantage over Neil’s nominalism. Depending on 
Bertrand - Non-Factive 
28 
how the strategy was understood, the nominalist could either co-opt Rose’s N-explanation 
or reject it. Yet her claim that realism offers an unopposed explanation for resemblance was 
required for the success of Rose’s explanationist argument. 
  As with the Conditional Strategy, Rose and Neil ought in principle to agree that the 
sharing (or not) of universals N-explains sameness and difference. On the Model Strategy, 
this amounts to agreeing that RESEMBLANCE is an apt witnessing model. This much is 
required in order for Rose’s N-explanatory claim to function as neutral evidence useful for 
adjudicating the debate between realism and nominalism. 
However, the Model Strategy affords Rose a distinctive way of claiming her N-
explanation that is not available to the nominalist. The N-explanation of similarity in terms 
of shared universals is appropriately claimed by realism and cannot be appropriated by 
nominalism simply because RESEMBLANCE represents a system in which realism is true 
and nominalism is false. In short, any apt model that witnesses Rose’s N-explanation also 
witnesses realism about universals and is incompatible with nominalism. This is in the same 
spirit as the Realism Biconditional from section 3.2. However, my claim here does not 
concern what is the case in the nearest worlds in which realism is true. It is instead a claim 
about the system that the model in fact represents. Indeed, RESEMBLANCE fails clause 2 
of Apt when offered by Neil: it entails determinative commitments that are inconsistent with 
other theoretical commitments made by nominalism – namely the non-existence of 
universals.  
This entails something similar to the right hand side of the Realism Biconditional: If 
RESEMBLANCE were a veridical model, then universals would F-explain similarity and 
difference. But unlike the right hand side of the Realism Biconditional, Neil shouldn’t reject 
this conditional claim. The nearest worlds in which RESEMBLANCE is veridical are ones in 
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which shared universals really do F-explain sameness. Neil ought to agree that Rose’s N-
explanation is genuine. And since RESEMBLANCE does not verify nominalism, Neil can’t 
plausibly co-opt Rose’s N-explanation either. The Model Strategy successfully accounts for 
Rose’s explanationist argument against Neil.xxii In doing so, it makes available the tools 
required to underwrite dialectically useful explanationist arguments. 
5 Conclusion: N-explanatory diagnostics for F-explanation 
In addition to the factive notion of metaphysical explanation already familiar in the 
literature, we require a non-factive notion of metaphysical explanation. This non-factive 
notion is what we appeal to when claiming that, between two incompatible theories, one 
offers a better metaphysical explanation for some phenomenon than the other. The Model 
Strategy offers a precise way of evaluating N-explanatory claims that nonetheless remains 
appropriately neutral: we can agree about what N-explains what in the midst of deep 
disagreement about what there is and what grounds what. The Model Strategy demonstrates 
that we can understand N-explanation in a way that is non-factive and at the same time is of 
a kind with F-explanation and similarly connected to metaphysical determination. 
What’s the relationship between F-explanation and N-explanation? Unfortunately, I 
lack the space to answer fully. Nonetheless in the spirit of Fine 2012, we can define the 
notion of F-explanation in terms of N-explanation as follows: 
F-explanation: [A] F-explains [B] iff <A> N-explains <B>, [A] and [B] are the case, 
and stand in the determinative relationship entailed by “<A> N-explains <B>.” 
This is akin to the additive strategy from section 2: F-explanations are N-explanations that 
are appropriately backed and have true relata. Unlike that strategy, we’ve characterized N-
explanation. The Model Strategy also suggests a way of defining N-explanation in terms of 
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F-explanation, since we look to the nature of F-explanation in order to define what linkages 
count as apt in our model. 
These notions are inter-definable, so there is no easy demonstration of the claim that 
F-explanation is more fundamental than N-explanation. Nonetheless, there are strong 
indicators that this is true. Intuitively, the Model Strategy consists of constructing a model 
representing a system in which F-explanation occurs, in order to determine what N-explains 
what. This is parasitic on F-explanation and so is our intuitive grip on N-explanation as 
potential F-explanation. 
Because of the close relationship between N and F-explanation, N-explanation can 
be useful for those of us who are interested in understanding the nature of metaphysical 
explanation more generally. We seem to owe our grip on metaphysical explanation to the 
examination of paradigmatic examples. And it is often claimed that theorizing about 
explanation should begin with examples and do justice to them. But clear and 
uncontroversial examples of metaphysical explanation are difficult to find: metaphysics is 
subject to a high degree of uncertainty and disagreement is the rule. 
Under these circumstances, it often proves useful to assume some interesting claims 
for the sake of argument in order to ask how they would be explanation-wise related if they 
were true. In other words, it’s useful to limn the explanatory connections among 
commitments in a way that is detached from considerations about their truth. We can do this 
by appealing to N-explanation. 
One way N-explanation might prove useful for general accounts of metaphysical 
explanation is as a sort of diagnostic for failures of F-explanation. If <A> N-explains <B>, 
we don’t yet know whether the facts they represent are also related by F-explanation. N-
explanatory claims do not secure F-explanatory ones. But if <A> fails to N-explain <B>, 
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perhaps by requiring explanatory connections that are inconsistent with our other 
commitments concerning F-explanation and grounding, we learn something about the F- 
explanatory structure of the world as well as it’s N-explanations: nowhere in the actual world 
does [A] F-explain [B] (unless, of course, our background assumptions are wrong). Even 
when we can afford only agnosticism about whether [A] and [B] are the case, N-explanation 
offers up a tool for ruling out explanatory connections between them. What remains are 
those potential F-explanations that are worthy of study and development. By developing 
theories to account for these cases of N-explanation, we will with luck produce successful 
theories of F-explanation as well.  
Focusing on N-explanation doesn't require anti-realism or a less ambitious view of 
metaphysics. Metaphysics aims at F-explanation. I've suggested N-explanations feature in a 
useful strategy for meeting this goal. Though compatible with many metaphysical views, N-
explanation pairs naturally with the view of metaphysics as modeling. Metaphysicians, like 
scientists develop models (often abstract or idealized) as indirect tools for understanding the 
world and its structure (Paul 2012; Williamson 2017). Integrating N-explanation into the 
metaphysics-as-modeling view must be left to future work.  
 
i Though occasionally explicit (Fine 2012; Schaffer 2016), this commitment is more often 
implicit. For example, grounding is widely claimed to relate facts or to operate on sentences, 
where the result is true only if its component sentences are. Grounding is then claimed to 
underwrite or be identical with metaphysical explanations sharing their relata (c.f. Rosen 
2010). 
ii Audi 2012b offers a longer list of canonical examples. Some metaphysical explanations may 
not be determinative or underwritten by grounding. See Bertrand 2018; Taylor 2018. 
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iii This disjunction divides unionism from separatism (Raven 2015). Both disjuncts are denied 
by opponents of Explanatory Realism (see Thompson 2016; Kovacs 2017; Taylor 2018). 
iv Unionists hold that determinative relations like composition or property realization back 
explanation. Jessica Wilson 2014 bases her skeptical challenge to grounding on this. 
Determinative relations are factive. And that's all we need. 
v This recalls Lewis’s 1983 argument against David Armstrong but isn’t intended as a faithful 
representation. Lewis’ argument is a more complex example of my target. 
vi I leave open why we should prefer the best explanation. Perhaps explanatoriness is the 
mark of truth. But Rose may instead endorse the weaker claim that explanatoriness is a 
theoretical virtue. Other things equal, we should accept the most virtuous theory.  
vii This case shares its relevant features with more complex cases where explanations 
compete but doesn’t require judgments of explanatory goodness. 
viii Though Fine’s considered view is that the factive notion is more fundamental. See Fine 
2012, p. 50. 
ix Subjunctive conditionals may have true antecedents (Lewis 1973, p. 3). 
x This is tacitly assumed in the metaphysics of properties, though Miller 2010 disputes it. 
Theories of properties are accounts of their nature and things have their natures necessarily.  
xi Impossibility weighs heavily against similarity (Nolan 1997, p. 550). 
xii Similarly, a strategy built on the material conditional fails: <A> N-explains <B> iff, If 
<A> and <B> then [A] F-explains [B]. Since by the lights of one party the embedded 
conditional will have a (necessarily) false antecedent, the conditional is trivially true. The 
explanation can be co-opted by any view on which <A> is necessarily false. 
xiii Unless counterpossibles are trivially true. If so, the Revised Conditional Strategy entails 
that any necessarily false theory offers every possible N-explanation. 
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xiv Some metaphysical determinative relations are same-making rather than difference-making 
and aren’t well represented by structural equation models. See Koslicki 2016, pp. 106–109; J. 
Wilson 2016, pp. 189–191. 
xv This amounts to defining a model and intervening on it. See Woodward 2003. For an 
explicit procedure concerning grounding see Schaffer 2016. 
xvi Without broad agreement concerning how explanation works, it’s difficult to see how 
explanationist arguments have purchase. 
xvii For this reason, we need not allow A to explain itself in the case that troubled the 
Subtractive Strategy. However, none of these claims are wholly uncontroversial. See Jenkins 
2011 on irreflexivity, Schaffer 2012 on transitivity, and Barnes Forthcoming on asymmetry. 
xviii Why doesn’t the problem for non-factive explanatory claims also emerge for non-factive 
grounding claims? It may. But I don’t face it here. I require consistency with the world’s 
determinative structure as it is taken to be by the explanans and its background. This concerns the 
determinative commitments of a theory and not the world’s determinative structure.  
xix If we don’t have qualms about abstracta then there’s an apt witnessing model because the 
world has among its constituents the abstract object that is the model. Those with qualms 
need a suitable nominalism. 
xx I assume there’s some enumeration scheme mapping determinate shades to unique real 
numbers. 
xxi The debate needn’t unfold this way. My claim is that the existence of an apt witnessing 
model makes Rose’s explanatory claim true. 
xxii Rose and Neil might both have had genuine N-explanations. The debate would then turn 
on whose N-explanation is better. One N-explanation is better than another if the 
explanation represented by its apt witnessing model is more virtuous than its competitor. 
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Determining how explanatory virtue works is beyond the scope of this paper. But it’s on this 
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